

23 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Security Clearance of DOD Employees  
Detailed to NPIC

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. The Office of Security has initiated investigative action to obtain the security records of the DOD employees detailed to NPIC and we will conduct additional investigation as deemed appropriate to bring those records into conformity with CIA standards. It is planned to complete the investigative review prior to initiating any polygraph action.

3. I am arranging a meeting with General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, DIA with a view to briefing him on our procedure for introducing the polygraph in the security processing of the DOD employees. A report on this matter will be made as soon as this meeting has been held.

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Director of Security

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Support) Mur  
SUBJECT: Security Processing of Military and Civilian Details to NPIC

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. On 24 October a meeting was held with General Joseph Carroll, Director of DIA, concerning the security clearance and polygraphing of military and civilian details from DIA to NPIC. General Carroll was informed that we have initiated investigative action to pull up the security records of all these employees and that this was the first step before polygraphing. In the event that any problem developed on the basis of the investigative records, we would consult with DIA as to how best to resolve the problem. It was understood that CIA would make its own determination on the security suitability of the personnel involved. It was explained to General Carroll that after the investigative action had been completed, we proposed to meet with the military and civilian details to NPIC and explain the purpose of the polygraph interview and request their full participation. General Carroll will have a DIA representative present who will speak for DIA in explaining the purpose and need for the polygraph interview. A full understanding on this entire process was reached with General Carroll and no difficulties developed. General Carroll was assured that in any case where the Agency felt the individual was not acceptable the matter would be worked out most carefully and quietly with the DIA.

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3. The next step is to meet with Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, in order to set up a polygraph program for the SPAD group which is detailed to NPIC from the Department of the Army. We have already initiated the investigative action to obtain the security records on this group.

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4. General Carroll discussed at length the various problems the DIA and the Department of Defense in general anticipate in improving their personnel security program and employing the polygraph as a part of the security processing. It was recognized that such a program does present some difficult problems; however, it was pointed out that these problems could be met if a polygraph program was introduced on a limited basis accompanied by a careful program of organization and education within those units where the polygraph was first introduced. It was evident that General Carroll felt that some improvement in the personnel security program was necessary and it was quite evident that he felt that he was under pressure to take definite steps in this regard. This was emphasized in General Carroll's assurances that something would be done.

5. The program of investigating and polygraphing of the SPAD and DIA personnel assigned to NPIC has been briefed to Mr. Lundahl of NPIC and [redacted] of DD/I. However, no mention of this will be made to the staff elements of these areas until we are fully prepared with our program.

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[redacted]  
R. L. Bannerman  
Director of Security

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cc: DD/S  
DD/O/DCI/NIPE.

Administration -- 1. The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management. 2. Internal management of units.

Administrative Control -- Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters, such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinates or other organizations. See also Control; Operational Control.

Operation -- A military action, or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives any battle or campaign.

Operational Control -- Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational control. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. See also Administrative Control; Control.